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COMPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS OF BULLET 
LEAD AS FORENSIC EVIDENCE* 
 
Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Ph.D.** 
INTRODUCTION 
In crimes involving shootings, bullets may be recovered from 
the crime scene and unexpended cartridges found in the possession 
of a suspect. Did they come from the same source? The method of 
choice for making this determination is a compositional analysis of 
trace elements in the bullet lead. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI or Bureau) laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, 
performs such analyses in federal crimes and, at the request of state 
law enforcement, in state crimes. It appears to be the only 
laboratory in the United States to do so on a regular basis.1 
Standard FBI procedure measures the concentrations of antimony, 
arsenic, bismuth, cadmium, copper, silver, and tin through an 
analytic method called inductively coupled plasma-optical 
                                                          
 * Originally published in a somewhat different form in Chance. Copyright 
2004 by the American Statistical Association. All rights reserved. 
 ** Michael O. Finkelstein is a member of the New York Bar, and the 
adjunct faculty of Columbia Law School and University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Mr. Finkelstein was a member of the National Research Council 
Committee on Scientific Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental Comparison, 
which published a report discussed in this article. A portion of this paper was 
delivered by Mr. Finkelstein at the Science for Judges program held at Brooklyn 
Law School on March 27, 2004. Bruce Levin is a Professor of Biostatistics and 
Chair of the Department of Biostatistics at the Mailman School of Public Health, 
Columbia University. 
1 The technique has been used by crime laboratories in other countries, 
among them, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, and South 
Africa. 
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emission spectroscopy. If the concentrations of all seven elements 
are close enough to be within measurement error, the FBI expert 
reports that the bullets are “analytically indistinguishable,” for 
which we will use the shorthand term “match.” The expert 
concludes from this that the bullets came from the same melt of 
lead, which is evidence that they were made at the same time by 
the same manufacturer, and some circumstantial evidence that they 
were bought at the same time by the suspect. Bullet lead evidence 
can thus act as a link tying a suspect to a crime. 
The method for measuring these element concentrations is not 
in serious dispute; however, arguments frequently arise regarding 
the probative value of a match. Beginning in 2000, two 
metallurgists, one of whom had worked at the FBI, began attacking 
the FBI’s bullet-lead matching testimony in court appearances. The 
Bureau responded by conducting and publishing studies on bullet-
lead matching and, in 2003, retained the National Research 
Council (NRC) to study the matter. The NRC appointed a 
Committee on Scientific Assessment of Bullet Lead Elemental 
Comparison (Committee) to study the technique and its 
presentation in court. The Committee met four times between 
February and May of 2003, heard presentations from the FBI, 
bullet manufacturers, and others, made analyses of FBI data, and 
researched cases in which FBI experts had testified. The 
Committee also invited critics of the FBI to appear; one lawyer 
accepted the invitation, made a written submission, and addressed 
the committee. The principal critics, however, declined to appear 
or make submissions. The Committee issued its report, entitled 
Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence, in February 
2004.2 
In discussing the Committee’s findings, we will focus on two 
aspects of this forensic technique: (1) testimony of the FBI’s expert 
witnesses and (2) scientific support for the reliability of the test. 
We begin by describing briefly the bullet manufacturing process 
and the FBI’s procedures for analyzing the composition of bullet 
                                                          
2 COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL 
COMPOSITION COMPARISON, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC 
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (2004) [hereinafter Report]. 
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lead. 
I. THE BULLET–LEAD MANUFACTURING PROCESS 
Recycled car batteries are the principal source of the lead used 
in most bullets made in the United States. Secondary smelters 
refine the lead by melting it in kettle-type furnaces to remove or 
reduce the amounts of certain trace elements. Manufacturers 
specify antimony within a range and other trace elements merely as 
maximum amounts. For example, one manufacturer specified a 
range of 0.85% ± 0.15% antimony for lead used for .22 long rifle 
bullets; maximal impurities for the other elements ranged from 
0.2% for tin to 0.01% for silver.3 
The kettles have a capacity of 25 to 150 tons a day. Molten 
lead is poured from the kettle to cast sows, billets, pigs or ingots. A 
sow will weigh 2,000 lbs; a billet, 70 to 350 lbs; and a pig or ingot, 
60 to 125 lbs. Castings by secondary smelters are sold to bullet 
manufacturers, who sometimes remelt and recast the lead. The cast 
lead is made into a wire by squeezing it through a narrow opening, 
like toothpaste from a tube, in a machine called an extruder. The 
wire is then cut into slugs, from which the bullets are shaped. The 
bullets are stored in a bin until they are assembled into cartridges. 
Slugs from several melts may be placed in the same bin. The 
number of bullets that are made from a melt or pour will vary 
widely. For example, a melt pot of 200,000 lbs will yield 
35,000,000 .22-caliber bullets, while a pig or ingot will yield 
10,000 to 20,000 bullets.4 The yield for larger caliber bullets will 
be smaller. When cartridges are packed into boxes (which typically 
hold fifty bullets each) there is routinely more than one melt 
represented in a box. Bullets from a single melt may be represented 
in thousands of boxes. 
II. THE FBI’S ANALYTIC METHOD AND MATCHING CRITERIA 
In making its analysis, the Bureau takes three fragments from 
                                                          
3 Id. at 78, Table 4.4. 
4 Id. at 74, Table 4.3. 
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each bullet, measures the seven elements for each fragment, and 
then takes the average of the replicate measurements for each 
element.5 It also estimates the standard deviation of its 
measurements from the variation in measurements of the three 
fragments. The concentrations in each fragment depend on the 
element involved. For example, in one sample they ranged from 
1.13% by weight for antimony to 0.0046% for silver.6 The 
standard deviation of the measurement ranged between 0.06 
percentage points for antimony to 0.0001 percentage points for 
silver.7 
The FBI currently uses one of two criteria to determine 
whether two bullets match. In the first method, the Bureau 
calculates a confidence interval of two standard deviations on 
either side of the average measurement for each element.8 If the 
confidence intervals for the crime scene bullets and the suspect’s 
bullets overlap to any extent for all seven elements, the bullets are 
declared to match. Because the standard deviations for the 
measurements of two bullets tend to be the same for the same 
element, differences of up to four standard deviations between 
measurements effectively are allowed for a match. 
This is not the standard way to define a match window in 
statistical science but rather an approximation of it. The usual 
criterion would define a window by the standard error of the 
difference between the two measurements, which is the square root 
of the sum of the variances for the two average measurements. If 
                                                          
5 The Bureau in fact makes three measurements for each fragment and 
takes the average as the measurement for that fragment. Since the committee 
treated that average as a single measurement for each fragment, we shall do so 
here. Id. at 29 n.5. 
6 Robert D. Koons & Diana M. Grant, Compositional Variation in Bullet 
Lead Manufacture, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. No. 5 1, 3 Table 8 (2002). This sample 
may understate the full range of variation; most bullets in the 1,837 sample 
contain one or more elements at concentrations more like 0.0002% at the low 
end. See discussion infra note 42. 
7 Antimony is present in larger quantities because it is added to the lead to 
increase hardness; except for maximal limitations, the others are uncontrolled 
trace elemental impurities. 
8 When we refer to standard deviation, we mean the standard deviation of 
the three measurements, not the standard error of the mean measurement. 
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the usual 5% test of statistical significance is applied as the 
criterion for the test as a whole, it must be adjusted for multiple 
comparisons when dealing with each element. In the commonly 
used Bonferroni method of adjustment, because there are seven 
chances to reject the null hypothesis (one for each element), the 
level of significance required to reject the null hypothesis for each 
element would be 0.05/7 = 0.00714.9 Applying a standard 
statistical test, this probability is reached at 5.07 standard errors.10 
Assuming that the standard deviation of measurement (denoted by 
σ) is the same for both bullets, the bullets would be declared to 
match if the difference between them is no more than 5.07 x 
(2/3)½σ = 4.14σ.11 On this assumption, the FBI’s 4σ match window 
is even slightly narrower than statistical convention would dictate. 
The size of the match window is important because the wider the 
window, the greater the number of declared matches and, with that, 
a greater risk that bullets will be declared matches even though 
they come from different melts. 
This does not mean that the Bureau’s two-standard-deviation 
rule is beyond criticism. From the criminal justice point of view, 
what matters most is that the test has sufficient statistical power. 
That is, if bullets come from different melts, the test with high 
probability will reject the null hypothesis that they are from the 
same melt. The practice of estimating standard deviations from 
only three observations significantly increases the size of the 
required match window, thus reducing the power of the test. It is 
for this reason that the Committee recommended that standard 
                                                          
9 With this adjustment, the level of significance for the overall test would 
be no greater than 5%. For a discussion of Bonferroni and other methods of 
adjustment, see MICHAEL O. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR 
LAWYERS 211 (2d ed. 2001). 
10 The test is a t-test with four degrees of freedom. For a discussion of the t-
test, see id. at 222. 
11 If the variance of a single measurement is σ2, then the variance of the 
average of the three measurements is σ2/3; the variance of the difference 
between the two average measurements (assuming σ2 is the same for both 
bullets) is σ2/3 + σ2/3, with standard error equal to [σ2/3 + σ2/3]1/2. A 95% two-
sided confidence interval, making the Bonferroni adjustment for the seven 
comparisons, is equal to 5.07 standard errors, or 5.07 x (2/3)½σ = 4.14σ. 
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deviations be estimated from historical data.12 If this were done, 
the number of standard errors required for the difference between 
the two measurements would be reduced to about 2.2σ, or almost 
half of the 4σ window.13 This would significantly increase the 
power of the test. 
In the second method, the FBI declares a match when the 
ranges of the two average measurements for an element overlap, 
that is, the largest of the three measurements for one bullet is 
greater than the smallest measurement for the other bullet. The 
range window is generally narrower than the two-standard-
deviation window and would tend to generate fewer false positives. 
Range overlap methods are appealing for statistical reasons 
because they are non-parametric and, therefore, universally valid 
for any distribution of elemental compositions. They are also 
appealing for the practical reason that they are easier to explain to 
a jury. 
III. THE FBI’S TESTIMONY 
Connecting a bullet from a crime scene to a particular suspect 
involves two steps. First, the FBI must perform a bullet lead 
analysis to determine whether the bullets found at the crime scene 
came from the same melt as the bullets found in the possession of 
the suspect. Second, an inference must then be made that the 
matching bullets came from the defendant. Problems arise 
regarding both of these steps. 
                                                          
12 Report, supra note 2, at 69. The committee’s recommendation assumes 
that good estimates of the standard errors can be made from the historical data; 
there are difficulties in this assumption and the idea has not been tested. 
13 Using a relatively large amount of historical data to estimate standard 
errors would justify using the normal distribution, which for the Bonferroni-
adjusted significance probability of 0.00714 is 2.69 standard errors. 2.69 x 
(2/3)½ σ = 2.2σ. Power would be further increased if methods other than 
Bonferroni were used to adjust for multiple comparisons. One such alternative is 
the Hochberg method. See Yosef Hochberg, A Sharper Bonferroni Procedure 
for Multiple Tests of Significance, 75 BIOMETRIKA 800 (1988); FINKELSTEIN & 
LEVIN, supra note 9. 
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A. Bullet Analysis 
In some cases, FBI witnesses have testified in a way that was 
considered unobjectionable by the Committee; for example, 
witnesses have testified that bullets were analytically 
indistinguishable,14 or that the bullets could have come from the 
same melt or source lead.15 In a number of cases, however, the 
Committee found that FBI testimony had gone considerably 
beyond what the science would justify. FBI witnesses have 
testified without qualification that matching bullets came from the 
same melt or source of lead, or were manufactured by the same 
company at the same time. Witnesses also have testified and 
prosecutors have argued, with various qualifications (or none), that 
bullets came from the same box of cartridges. 
For example, in United States v. Davis, the expert testified 
unequivocally that the “bullets must have been manufactured at the 
same Remington factory, must have come from the same batch of 
lead, must have been packaged on or about the same day, and 
could have come from the same box.”16 In State v. Washington, the 
FBI expert testified that the elemental profile of bullets in a melt 
was “unique.”17 
Further, in State v. Noel, the prosecution in summation referred 
to snowflakes and fingerprints to describe the uniqueness of melts 
of lead, and argued that the FBI witness’ testimony was reliable 
scientific evidence not only that the bullets “came from the same 
source of lead at the manufacturer,” but also that they were “sold 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 776 A.2d 685, 689 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2001) (quoting a witness as testifying that “[t]he lead material in one bullet and 
one projectile was analytically indistinguishable, as was the lead in one bullet 
and the other two projectiles”). 
15 See, e.g., State v. Krummacher, 523 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Or. 1974) (stating 
that that the “analyses showed that the bullet could have come from the same 
batch of metal as the group of bullets which was taken from defendant’s home 
but not from the same batch as any of the other groups”). 
16 103 F.3d 660, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1996). 
17 Trial Transcript of Testimony of Charles Peters at 9, 21-22, State v. 
Washington, No. 96-GS-40-10316 (S.C. Ct. 1998). 
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in the same box.”18 The New Jersey intermediate appellate court 
reversed the conviction, holding that “the clear import of the 
fingerprint and snowflake comparison was to suggest to the jury a 
scientific certainty in the inference that defendant had possessed 
both bullets and to suggest to the jury a conclusiveness of that 
inference that clearly was not warranted.”19 On further appeal, 
however, the New Jersey Supreme Court conceded that the 
prosecutor’s argument may have been “excessive,” but held that it 
might pass as “fair comment” and reinstated the conviction.20 
More acceptably, witnesses have testified that the laboratory 
finding that bullets matched was “consistent with their having 
come from the same box of ammunition,”21 or was evidence that 
they “could have come from the same box or another box 
manufactured on the same day.”22 Although literally true, these 
formulations invite the jury to overestimate the evidence. 
Nevertheless, they have been upheld on appeal.23 
The Committee disapproved of such testimony and argument. 
The obvious point is that witnesses who testify without 
qualification and prosecutors who argue in this manner do not 
admit that melts are not unique in elemental composition and that 
tests have measurement error. Thus, the fact that bullets match is 
only a probability statement that they came from the same melt. 
The Committee also disapproved of testimony suggesting that 
matching bullets came from the same box because of the large 
number of boxes that are filled, wholly or partly, with bullets from 
                                                          
18 723 A.2d 602, 608 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
19 State v. Noel, 697 A.2d 157, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), rev’d, 
723 A.2d 602 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999). 
20 Noel, 723 A.2d at 607. 
21 State v. Reynolds, 297 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1982) (“Further, neutron 
activation analysis revealed that the bullets taken from Morgan and Stone and 
the ammunition found with the defendant were of the same chemical 
composition, consistent with their having come from the same box of 
ammunition.”). 
22 State v. Grube, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Idaho 1994). 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 103 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that “[t]he expert testimony demonstrated a high probability that the 
bullets spent at the first robbery and the last robbery originated from the same 
box of cartridges”). 
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a single melt. But the Committee’s objections also went deeper 
than this: they included the case in which a witness testifies that 
matching bullets probably came from the same melt. To 
understand the Committee’s objection to such testimony, one has 
to consider the probative force of the matching evidence in more 
detail. 
The probative force of finding that two bullets match can be 
expressed by the odds that they came from the same melt, given 
that they match. These odds are usually called posterior odds 
because they are posterior to, or conditioned upon, the matching 
evidence. By Bayes’s theorem of elementary probability, these 
odds are equal to the prior odds multiplied by the likelihood ratio. 
The equation can be written as follows: 
 
ratioLikelihoododdsriorPoddsPosterior ×=  
 
The terms of the equation can be defined as: 
 
 
 
In this equation, ]|[ matchmeltsameP  is read as the conditional 
probability that two bullets would have come from the same melt, 
given that they match, with analogous interpretations for the other 
conditional probability terms. 
Unlike the other terms in the equation, the prior odds are not 
based on conditional probabilities, but rather are the odds that one 
would give that the bullets came from the same melt before they 
are tested for match status. Prior odds must be based on the other 
evidence in the case that connects the suspect to the crime. 
Typically, there is no objective way of estimating prior odds; this 
must be done subjectively, based on the odds that the factfinder 
would give in betting on the proposition, in this case, that the 
bullets came from the same melt (which the factfinder might 
explicitly or implicitly infer from other evidence of the suspect’s 
guilt). Expert witnesses have no particular expertise beyond that of 
the lay factfinders to estimate prior odds and, consequently, have 
]|[
]|[
][
][
]|[
]|[
meltsdifferentmatchP
meltsamematchP
meltsdifferentP
meltsameP
matchmeltsdifferentP
matchmeltsameP
×= . 
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no basis for using their estimates of prior odds to testify as experts 
to posterior odds based on the matching test. 
The second part of the equation, the likelihood ratio, is a 
measure of the strength of the matching evidence. In theory, this 
can be determined on an objective basis and is an appropriate 
subject of expertise. In this context, the likelihood ratio for the 
matching evidence is equal to the probability of observing a match, 
given that the bullets came from the same melt, divided by the 
probability of observing such a match if the bullets came from 
different melts. The larger the likelihood ratio, the stronger the 
evidence. 
Consider first the numerator of the likelihood ratio. If melts of 
lead were perfectly homogeneous in elemental composition, the 
probability of observing a match if two bullets came from the same 
melt would be one, so the numerator of the likelihood ratio would 
be one.24 Allowing 5% for measurement error, for example, the 
numerator would be 0.95. 
The denominator of the likelihood ratio is the probability of 
declaring a match when two bullets come from different melts. 
This type of error is known as a false positive. Assume that the rate 
of false positives is 1/1000. In that case, the denominator of the 
likelihood ratio would be 1/1000, and the likelihood ratio, 
assuming the numerator to be 0.95, would be 0.95/(1/1000) = 950. 
On these assumptions, matching is strong evidence that the bullets 
come from the same melt. 
If the assumed value for the likelihood ratio is fully supported 
(an important subject that we will address), what can the expert say 
in such a case? She cannot testify to the odds or probabilities that 
the bullets came from the same melt because those odds depend on 
the prior odds and, as noted, she has no more expertise in 
appraising those odds than the lay factfinders. Moreover, the 
expert’s prior odds may not be the same as the jury’s and so her 
testimony would not “fit” the case.25 What the expert can describe 
is either the likelihood ratio associated with a match or its effect on 
                                                          
24 This assumes that the test was error free. 
25 See, e.g., State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1993) (rejecting 
an expert’s posterior probability testimony based on the expert’s assumed 50% 
prior probability). 
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the posterior odds. The description of the likelihood ratio would be 
as follows: The probability of seeing a match is 950 times greater 
if bullets came from the same melt than if they came from different 
melts. Alternatively, the expert may describe the effect on the 
posterior odds by stating: The odds that two bullets came from the 
same melt are increased 950 times when a match is identified. 
Notice that in both formulations, the witness does not give the 
absolute level of probabilities or odds, for example, that the bullets 
probably came from the same melt, but only the change in 
probabilities or odds attendant on finding a match. 
In light of the potentially misleading nature of bullet lead 
evidence, the Committee recommended that FBI experts limit their 
testimony to a description of the likelihood ratio associated with a 
given match, as described above. In fact, the Committee went 
further and recommended that, in view of the uncertainties in the 
estimates of the error rates, FBI experts should not quantify the 
likelihood ratio, but should only say that bullets from the same 
melt are more likely to be analytically indistinguishable than 
bullets from different melts, or that the fact that bullets are 
analytically indistinguishable makes it more likely that they came 
from the same melt.26 The testimonial limitations suggested in the 
Committee’s recommendation obviously would apply not only to 
bullet lead, but to all kinds of expert identification testimony. If 
generally adopted, they would change the way opinions in expert 
testimony are expressed in our courts.  
                                                          
26 Report, supra note 2, at 107. 
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B. Defendant as the Source 
When confronted with FBI testimony that bullets match, 
defense counsel commonly and correctly point out that many 
bullets are made from a single melt. The number ranges from 
thousands to millions, and there is usually no way of knowing how 
large the melt was for the bullets involved in a case. Moreover, 
geographical distribution of bullets from a melt may affect the 
probability of finding matching bullets. For example, if bullets 
made from a single melt are sent to a distributor in a small town or 
to a vendor in a city neighborhood, every gun owner in the area 
may have them. But distribution patterns, as the Committee’s 
report makes clear, are not available to the public and were not 
made available by manufacturers to the Committee.27 
These gaps in our knowledge do not affect the likelihood ratio 
associated with bullet lead matching or the validity of test. 
Whether there are many or few bullets made from a melt, or how 
they are distributed, does not affect the probability that the bullets 
would match if they came from the same melt or the probability 
that they would match if they came from different melts. What 
these factors do affect is the second inference, that is, the 
probability that the crime-scene bullet came from the defendant if 
the bullets came from the same melt. While it is reasonable to 
conclude that it is more likely that the crime-scene bullet came 
from the defendant if it matches the defendant’s other bullets than 
if it did not, no FBI bullet-lead witness has the expertise to attach a 
probability to that inference. Thus, the report ruled out any 
testimony as to that probability as a matter of expertise, 
recognizing that jurors would have to take that step, if at all, on 
their own.28 
The difficulty is that jurors have no common experience by 
which to judge the strength of the connection between a bullet’s 
coming from the same melt and from the same person. Bullet-lead 
matching has been described as circumstantial evidence akin to 
testimony that the suspect wore a red ski parka coupled with an 
                                                          
27 Id. at 102. 
28 Id. 
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investigator’s finding a red ski parka in the suspect’s closet. But in 
that case, jurors may have some feeling (possibly quite wrong) for 
the frequency of red parkas and their distribution, while in bullet 
lead matching they have no experience with either subject. The 
absence of expert testimony on the subject of frequency and 
distribution significantly weakens the value of this evidence. 
The effect of the size of the melt and the distribution of bullets 
made from it can be formalized by considering the likelihood ratio 
(LR) for a match, given that the crime-scene bullet came from the 
defendant or from someone else. As previously noted, given that 
the bullets came from the same melt or from different melts, the 
conditional probabilities of a match do not depend on whether or 
not the defendant is the source of the bullet. It follows that the LR 
can be expressed as: 
 
,
]|[]|[]|[]|[
]|[]|[]|[]|[
]|[
]|[LR
GSPSMPGSPSMP
GSPSMPGSPSMP
GMP
GMP
⋅+⋅
⋅+⋅==  
where M is the event that the bullets match; S is that they come 
from the same melt; S  is that they come from different melts; G is 
that the crime-scene bullet came from the defendant; and G  is that 
it came from someone else. Assuming that false positives are rare, 
]|[ SMP  will be quite small and the second term of the numerator 
and denominator may be disregarded. Moreover, because the FBI 
will test all of the defendant’s bullets, it is very likely that if the 
defendant is the source of the crime-scene bullet, the Bureau will 
find at least one of defendant’s bullets from the same melt; thus 
]|[ GSP  will be close to 1. With these reductions, LR will be 
approximately equal to ]|[1 GSP , the reciprocal of the probability 
that an innocent person would have a bullet from the same melt as 
the crime-scene bullet. This probability depends on the size of the 
melt and distribution practices, as previously noted. 
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IV. THE ISSUE OF SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT 
A. Homogeneity of Melts 
The validity of even properly circumscribed testimony depends 
on scientific support for the likelihood ratio associated with the 
test. Assumed values for both the numerator and denominator of 
the ratio have been subjected to criticism. The numerator is the 
probability that the FBI would declare a match if the two bullets 
came from the same melt. As noted, this turns on the homogeneity 
of melts and, to a lesser extent, on measurement error. If melts are 
inhomogeneous, then the probability of finding a match will be 
reduced for bullets from the same melt. 
The Committee spent considerable time examining the 
evidence bearing on homogeneity. Experts agreed that there was 
some inhomogeneity in a melt, but disagreed on its extent and 
significance.29 The melting process causes convective stirring of 
the molten lead in the kettle, so that all of the bullets made from 
the same melt would tend to have the same elemental composition. 
However, some smelters add lead to replenish the pot during a 
pour and this can change the composition of billets created during 
an extended pour. Inhomogeneity may also arise because solutes 
tend to migrate to the center of the billet during solidification. On 
the other hand, the extrusion process is thought to reduce 
inhomogeneity caused by segregation because the flow of the solid 
is turbulent as the billet is squeezed through the mouth of the die.30 
After considering conflicting reports on homogeneity, the 
Committee concluded that it was “unclear whether macro- and 
microscale inhomogeneities are present at some or all of the stages 
                                                          
29 Compare Robert D. Koons & Diana M. Grant, Compositional Variation 
in Bullet Lead Manufacture, 47 J. FOREN. SCI. 950 (2002) (finding no significant 
inhomogeneity), with Erik Randich et al., A Metallurgical Review of the 
Interpretation of Bullet Lead Compositional Analysis, 127 FOREN. SCI. INT’L. 
174 (2000) (finding significant inhomogeneity). 
30 Report, supra note 2, at 82-84. 
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of lead and bullet production and if such inhomogeneities would 
affect [compositional analysis of bullet lead or] CABL.”31 
Arguably, it is unnecessary to resolve the issue of homogeneity 
to make use of CABL. In its report, the Committee dealt with the 
problem by making the reasonable assumption that at least some 
part of a melt had to be homogeneous within measurement error 
(otherwise there would be no matches) and by treating that part, in 
effect, as a smaller melt. The Committee called this a 
“compositionally indistinguishable volume of lead” or “CIVL.”32 
The CIVL might be as large as a vat of molten lead, the 
composition of which was not altered during the pouring of bullets, 
or a series of billets that were poured before the composition of the 
vat was altered by the addition of more lead to replenish the vat. 
The report observed that the probative force of a match would be 
increased if only a part of a melt were homogeneous because fewer 
matching bullets would be made from a smaller volume of lead.33 
B. Measurement Error 
In appraising the number of bullets produced by the CIVL, 
however, the report recognized that it would have to be assumed, 
conservatively, that the entire melt was involved because the size 
of the CIVL could not be known.34 With this assumption, the 
numerator of the likelihood ratio would be one, except for 
measurement error. Measurement error could potentially affect the 
test by causing it to declare that bullets do not match when, in fact, 
the bullets came from the same melt. This type of error makes the 
numerator of the likelihood ratio less than one and reduces the 
probative force of the test, other things being equal. However, as 
noted above, the effect would be small. Moreover, by declaring a 
non-match when bullets in fact come from the same melt, the 
                                                          
31 Id. at 82. 
32 Id. at 98. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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effect of this error will generally be exonerating, which makes it of 
lesser concern than a false positive.35 
More significantly, the allowance for measurement error 
creates the match window that leads an FBI expert to conclude that 
two bullets that have different measurements, but are within the 
window, are “analytically indistinguishable.” The size of the 
window affects the denominator of the likelihood ratio, and it is the 
denominator that is of greater concern because it measures the rate 
of falsely incriminating evidence. The value of the denominator, 
assumed to be very small, is what makes the likelihood ratio so 
large. 
C. The Problem of False Positives 
Scientific support for the assumed low rate of false positives 
raises a controversial issue.36 The risk of coincidental matches is 
the point of focus for critics of the FBI, who argue that the risk of 
false positives is much higher than FBI witnesses admit.37 On the 
stand, FBI experts have gone so far as to describe the rate of false 
positives as zero.38 In response to claims that the false positive rate 
was high, the FBI made a study of the matter and the question now 
is whether that study justifies the conclusion that the FBI would 
draw from it.39 
                                                          
35 But not always. For example, if one of two suspects did a shooting, 
finding that the bullets did not match those in the house of one suspect would be 
some evidence, perhaps not very strong, pointing to the other. 
36 It might be thought that if the FBI testifies only that the bullets are 
analytically indistinguishable that there is no false positive because the 
statement is true when there is a coincidental match. However, what follows 
from that conclusion, stated or unstated, is that the bullets come from the same 
melt, and that is false. 
37 Randich et al., supra note 29. 
38 See, e.g., Trial Transcript of Testimony of Charles Peters at 9, 21-22, 
State v. Washington, No. 96-GS-40-10316 (S.C. Ct. 1998). 
39 A weakness of the study is that it has not been published. Robert Koons, 
the principal FBI architect of the study, is in the course of preparing it for 
publication. The description of the study, which follows, is based on 
presentations made by Mr. Koons to the commission. See Report, supra note 2, 
at 28-35, 54-60. 
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In conducting the study, the FBI used its archive data on 
approximately 23,000 bullets that were collected over fourteen 
years in about 1,000 cases. From this inventory, the Bureau 
collected data for as many bullets as it could reasonably be sure 
came from different melts. To arrive at this sample, the Bureau 
took each case in its inventory and selected from it data for one 
bullet of each type (principally caliber), of each alloy class 
(defined by the amount of antimony in the lead), and from each 
manufacturer (when this was known). If there were multiple bullets 
in the same cluster, the Bureau picked one at random. The Bureau 
also included data for some bullets that were not connected with 
any case. However, it did not make cross–case comparisons, that 
is, it did not rule out multiple bullets from the same alloy class of 
the same manufacturer across cases. Thus, some bullets included in 
the sample might have come from the same melt. 
The Bureau collected data from 1,837 bullets as a result of this 
winnowing process.40 It then looked at every possible pair of 
bullets and counted the number of matches by its two-standard-
deviation criterion. There were 1,686,366 pairs, of which 693 
matched, or about 1 in 2,433. Because the bullets in the selected 
sample came primarily (if not exclusively) from different melts, 
the results of the study indicate that the probability of a false 
positive would be less than 1 in 2,433. Although current practice is 
to measure concentrations of seven elements, not all bullets in the 
selected sample had all seven elements measured. The rate of false 
positives is even lower if attention is confined to those bullets in 
the selected sample for which all seven elements were measured. 
There were 854 such bullets and 47 pairs matched by the two-
standard-deviation criterion.41 With 364,231 possible pairs and 47 
matches, the rate of false matching is less than 1 in 7,750. These 
results strongly support the FBI’s opinion that a positive test is 
highly probative evidence that matching bullets came from the 
same melt.42 
                                                          
40 We refer to this process and the collection of bullets as the “selected 
sample.” 
41 Report, supra note 2, at 190, Table K.8. 
42 The FBI frequently compares one or more crime-scene bullets against 
multiple bullets found in the possession of the suspect. In such cases involving 
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The Committee’s report faced two ways on the rate of false 
positives. On one hand, the report determined that “CABL is 
sufficiently reliable to support testimony that bullets from the same 
compositionally indistinguishable volume of lead (CIVL) are more 
likely to be analytically indistinguishable than bullets from 
different CIVLs.”43 Although this testimony could be given even 
with a high rate of false positives,44 the concept of reliable 
scientific evidence surely implies that the procedure’s rate of false 
positives will be low. This assumption is made explicit in other 
places in the report. For example, the report sets out a proposed 
“boiler plate” informational sheet to be distributed to lawyers and 
judges with the FBI’s laboratory report. The Committee suggests 
that the sheet include the following: “Considering the thousands of 
‘batches’ of lead produced over a number of years, there is a 
reasonably high probability that some will repeat. However, the 
probability that any given composition would repeat within the 
next several years could be expected to be quite low.”45 This 
sounds reasonable, but neither the report nor the sheet supports 
either statement, nor defines the phrase “quite low.” 
One might think that these findings were based on the FBI 
study, even though it is not cited in support of them. However, 
although the report confirms the FBI’s result, it puts the study to 
one side on the ground that the sample collected by the FBI was 
not a random sample and could have been biased.46 The possibility 
of bias is based on the fact that the winnowing process could have 
made the bullets in the selected sample further apart in elemental 
                                                          
multiple comparisons, the usual statistical practice is to multiply the probability 
of a false positive in a single comparison by the number of comparisons to 
obtain an upper bound for the probability of one or more false positives among 
the multiple comparisons. Thus, if many comparisons are made, the risk of a 
false positive can become much larger than when a single comparison is made. 
See FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 59-60. 
43 Report, supra note 2, at 107. This finding is repeated in Chapter 5, Major 
Findings and Recommendations. Id. at 112. 
44 For example, if the numerator of the likelihood ratio were 1, the 
described testimony would be literally true if the rate of false positives were any 
number less than 100%. 
45 Id. at 168. 
46 Id. at 40, 49, 55. 
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composition than bullets in some relevant population, producing a 
lower rate of false matches in the sample than in the population.47 
Instead of the low rates of false positives generated in the 
FBI’s study, the authors of Chapter 3 of the Committee’s report 
estimated remarkably higher rates of false positives using 
computer simulations.48 However, these simulated rates are 
unlikely to be good estimates of the actual rates of false positives. 
The simulations were of probabilities conditional on various 
assumed differences in elemental concentrations between the crime 
scene bullets and the suspect’s bullets; there was no attempt to 
calculate an unconditional probability that would incorporate the 
likelihood that differences as small as those assumed would in fact 
be encountered in bullets from different melts. Taking those 
likelihoods into account would probably decrease the simulated 
rates.49 This is a striking omission given that the risk of false 
positives is the principal point of attack by critics of the FBI. 
D. Testimony of Bullet Lead Analysis and Daubert 
Thus, the FBI study is the only current basis for estimating the 
unconditional rate of false positives. But since that study was 
rejected for possible bias, the Committee’s conclusion that the 
evidence was reliable, while not unreasonable, would seem to lack 
                                                          
47 Id. The committee did not specify a relevant population and referred to it 
somewhat inconsistently. Compare id. at 56 (“all bullets collected by the FBI in 
criminal investigations”), with id. at 49 (“a full subset of bullets drawn from 
different melts”). We suggest that a useful population would be all bullets sent 
to the FBI that came from different melts. 
48 See id. at 59, Table 3.10 (false positive rates between 12.7% and 40.4%). 
49 In the simulations, the assumed differences between bullets would appear 
to be smaller than the average actual differences between bullets from different 
melts, which increases the simulated rate of false positives. Table 3.10 reports, 
in columns, simulated false positive rates for differences in elemental 
composition between bullets assuming a range of 3% to 10%, whereas the actual 
differences for five of the elements in the selected sample range between 20% 
and 52%. The footnote to the table acknowledges that “the columns represent 
differences in bullets that are relatively small given the distribution of between-
bullet differences from the 1,837 bullet set. One would expect the false match 
probability to be smaller for larger differences between bullets.” Id. at 59. 
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scientific support (at least none is cited within the report). The 
existence of such support is required for admissibility of expert 
scientific testimony under Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals.50 
The FBI has argued that its extensive experience is a 
reasonable substitute for a quantitative study and in some courts it 
may be seen as such. In fact, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has 
long affirmed that an expert may be qualified on the basis of 
“experience” to testify to “technical or other specialized 
knowledge.”51 
The rationale for Daubert’s strict standards suggests, however, 
that bullet lead analysis is not a field in which one may rely on 
experience in the absence of a rigorous study. One of the factors 
listed by the court in Daubert as the test of scientific knowledge is 
the known or potential error rate.52 The FBI’s extensive experience 
does not give it a solid basis for determining the rate of false 
positives because the examiners have no way of knowing whether 
the bullets they matched in fact came from the same melt. As a 
result, the FBI’s testimony is delivered with the impressive 
credentials of hard science, but the core of the matter is a distinctly 
unscientific leap of faith. Jurors (and some judges) are apt to 
ascribe at least some of the authority of the scientific part of the 
enterprise to the expert’s unsupported belief—delivered with equal 
conviction—that the technique she uses has a low error rate. 
Of course, the belief of the expert witness is unsupported only 
if one does not credit the FBI’s study. In United States v. Mikos,53 
the only opinion that directly addresses the validity of the study 
under Daubert, District Judge Guzman rejected the study and 
excluded the expert’s proffered opinion that the bullets probably 
came from the same melt.54 Judge Guzman based his ruling on the 
                                                          
50 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the general acceptance of a scientific 
technique is not a precondition for admission of expert testimony based upon 
that technique so long as the standards of reliability and relevance under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence are met). 
51 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
52 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
53 2003 WL 22922197 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
54 Id. at *6. 
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conclusion that the FBI’s sample was not randomly selected. The 
court wrote that it agreed with the defense’s argument that the 
FBI’s collection methods lacked “any scientifically accepted 
sampling procedure,” and concluded that because “the FBI’s 
historical database fails to satisfy accepted scientific methodology 
. . . [it] cannot form the basis for expert opinion testimony under 
Daubert.”55 
V. A NEW APPROACH FOR THE FBI 
The FBI is presently considering how to respond to the Mikos 
case. The court in Mikos may have been too quick in rejecting the 
Bureau’s selected sample study as unscientific. Because most of the 
cases in the FBI’s inventory were included, the FBI’s study did not 
involve a sample of cases, but rather a sampling of bullets from 
clusters. Multi-level sampling, including cluster sampling, is a well-
accepted statistical technique.56 Nevertheless, the reaction of the 
                                                          
55 Id. at *5. The court also commented that the FBI’s sample of 1,837 
bullets was too small to be reliable to extrapolate to 150 billion bullets made in 
the United States during the past thirty years and that there was no precise and 
generally accepted definition of a “source” or “batch.” Id. 
 These objections do not seem to be valid. The fact that sources may come in 
different sizes and may be inhomogeneous does not, for the reasons already 
given, detract from the evidence and may in fact add to it when a match is 
found. The fact that the FBI inventory is small relative to the universe of bullets 
is not of concern for three reasons: (1) the population to be represented arguably 
is the population of bullets sent to the FBI that are from different melts and this 
population is not huge relative to the sample; (2) in any event, the size of the 
population being represented is irrelevant to the scientific acceptability of the 
sample; and (3) if the population were more diverse than the sample, as the court 
implies, the study would overstate, not understate, the rate of false positives. 
 A more telling objection would be that the FBI’s inventory includes bullets 
analyzed over the past 14 years. In that time elemental composition may have 
changed, creating larger differences between bullets made over time than across 
those made currently. For example, the Bureau has noted a decline in silver 
during this period. The influence of this factor has yet to be studied. The Bureau 
acknowledges this point, but replies that sometimes old bullets are found in 
current cases, so one cannot assume that all comparisons will be made between 
currently made bullets. 
56 See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 9, at 257-60. 
FINKELSTEIN MACROED FINAL 2-17-05.DOC 3/8/2005 12:33 PM 
140 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Mikos court suggests that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, 
for the Bureau to winnow out bullets from its inventory to ensure 
that they come from different melts without incurring the risk that 
the sample so selected will be rejected as possibly biased. We 
therefore suggest that the Bureau take a different tack and select a 
random sample of bullets without eliminations for same-melt status 
and compute the rate of positives, both true and false, as an upper 
bound for the rate of false positives. Our preliminary analysis 
indicates that such positives would be quite rare—less than one in a 
thousand—which would seem to provide ample support for the 
reliability of CABL and justify the Committee’s conclusion in that 
regard. 
In our analysis, a cluster of bullets is a group of bullets of the 
same characteristics (for example, alloy class, style, etc.) organized 
such that only one of them would be picked under the FBI’s 
selected sample procedure. We make the “worst case” assumption 
that the clusters are perfectly homogeneous, that is, that all the 
bullets in a cluster would match each other. It follows that when 
two bullets from two different clusters match, all the bullets in the 
two clusters would match each other and when two bullets from 
different clusters do not match, then none of the bullets in the two 
clusters would match across the clusters.57 
Let there be n cases in the FBI’s selected sample and assume 
that there are two clusters of bullets in each case; thus there are 2n 
clusters. Assume further that there are m matching pairs. Under the 
FBI’s method of taking one bullet from each cluster, the rate of 
false matches would be 
 



=
2
2n
mR .58 
                                                          
57 This applies only across clusters; they would still match within the 
clusters. 
58 The expression 



2
2n
 should be read as “2n choose 2,” the number of 
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Now assume that each cluster is of size c and that all bullets are 
included in the study, not merely one from each cluster. What is 
the rate of matches (say, R’), both true and false? On the “worst 
case” assumption previously described, the number of matches 
from the m matching pairs of clusters is 




2
2c
m and the number of matches from the 2n-2m non-matching 
clusters is 
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c
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1 −=−  to the rate of matching. When 
n is large, this is not a large addition and it leaves the rate of 
matching quite low. 
For example, suppose that there are n = 1,000 cases (as the FBI 
has in its inventory), each with two clusters (about the average 
number per case in the FBI selected sample study) and that each 
cluster has c = 10 bullets (the average size for the FBI clusters in 
its study). Suppose further that the rate of matching in the selected 
                                                          
pairs that can be chosen from 2n bullets. 
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sample study is R=1/2400, as the FBI found. Consequently, 
154,1
1
000,20
9' =+≈ RR . 
This last result is an upper bound for the rate of matches, both 
true and false, and is thus a kind of upper-upper bound for the rate 
of false matches.59 Of course, this is only an estimate using our 
worst case assumption and an average size for clusters; the FBI 
would have to draw a random sample and apply its criteria to 
demonstrate convincingly that the rate of matching is low. To add 
credibility, any new study should be designed, or at least approved, 
by outside experts, and the results should be published in a peer-
reviewed journal. 
 
                                                          
59 The rate would be even lower if attention is confined to bullets for which 
all seven elements have been measured. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
